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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14517

vs
WILLIAM W. MORRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
WILLIAM W. MORRIS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This brief is submitted by Appellant William W. Morris (hereinafter "Appellant") in response to the brief of Respondent
Packaging Corporation of America (hereinafter "Respondent"), and
in light of the recently decided cases of Union Ski Company v.
Union Plastics Corporation. 548 P»2d 1257 (Utah, 1976); Cate Rental
Company, Inc. v. Whalen & Company. 549 P.2d 707 (Utah, 1976); and
Chevron Chemical Company v. Mecham. 550 P.2d 182 (Utah, 1976).
Appellant submits that the foregoing cases require a reversal herein and emphasizes that said cases were decided by this Court subsequent to the trial of the instant matter, inasmuch as judgment was

rendered herein in October of 1975, and the cited cases were decided in the Spring of 1976.

Copies of the referenced cases are

attached hereto.
REVIEW OF RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent's statement of facts in its brief is inaccurate
and states conclusions that are unfounded and misleading, which
an examination of the trial transcript demonstrates.

For example,

on page 3 of Respondent's brief, it is stated that after Appellant
signed the subject guaranty, he sent it to Milt Gordon " . . . for
transportation to Respondent's plant in Salt Lake City, Utah."
(R. 169, i. 15-16)

An examination of the record, however, indicate

that on lines 15 and 16, Appellant testified as follows with respect to the guaranty:
to Milt Gordon".

"As I recall I either gave it or mailed it

Respondent therefore added its interpretation to

the record with respect to the words "for transportation to Respondent's plant in Salt Lake City" which is both wrong and misleading.
Appellant testified only that the guaranty was given to Milt Gordon
On the same page of the trial record, at lines 17 through 27, Mr.
Morris states, instead, that he signed the guaranty and gave it to
Milt Gordon with the condition that William Birkinshaw should sign
it too.

Mr. Morris did not communicate that condition to Responden

but he did to both Mr. Gordon and Mr. Birkinshaw.

He did not give

it to "his agent" Milt Gordon, to transport it directly to PCA,

2~

inasmuch as Mr. Gordon had no authorization to do so. While Mr.
Gordon assisted Mr. Morris in overseeing his interests in Utah,
he had no authorization either to negotiate or to sign a guaranty
on behalf of Mr. Morris and was therefore not Morris1 agent for the
purposes of this action brought under UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section
78-27-23(2).
Mr. Gordon was unable to execiite the guaranty for Mr. Morris
and he had express instructions regarding its delivery.

He was

not conducting business for Morris, but was, rather, overseeing Mr.
Morris1 investment in the cookie factory as were "Mr. Birkinshaw
and the other people at the Draper plant.11

(R. 168, jL. 16-19)

It

is therefore clear that, if anything, a limited agency existed pertaining only to the delivery of the guaranty and the overseeing of
Morris1 investment.

It was not Appellantfs intent that the guaranty

reach Respondent until and unless Mr. Birkinshaw signed it and Mr.
Gordon had no power to bind Mr. Morris contrary to his instructions.
The record clearly reflects this intent and Mr. Gordon's position,
even though Respondent has confused the facts in its brief.
DISCUSSION
As previously indicated, the Utah Supreme Court cases decided
subsequent to the trial of the instant matter and the preparation of
Appellant's opening brief require a reversal herein because the trial
court permitted the improper extension of jurisdiction over the

-3-

Appellant.

Respondent's efforts to distinguish the foregoing

cases fail inasmuch as thos efforts attempt a distinction without
a difference.
Cate Rental, supra, involved a Utah corporation and a Montana
corporation who agreed by telephone to lease a front-end loader*
Cate Rental attempted to assert long-arm jurisdiction over Whalen 01
the following grounds:

(1) that defendant had been a customer of

plaintiff for over ten years; (2) that defendant called plaintiff
by telephone to discuss the rental or purchase or equipment on the
average of five times a year during each of the previous ten years;
(3) that plaintiff would ship equipment F.O.B. to its offices in
Salt Lake City, and defendant would pay by mail; and (4) that defendant's president came to Salt Lake City in 1973 to discuss
business dealings.

Notwithstanding the on-going nature of the

contacts, which even outnumber the contacts in the instant case,
the Court found that the contacts were insufficient to warrant the
imposition of jurisdiction because of the test of substantial activj
with some degree of continuity within the state where it appeared.
549 P.2d at 708.
Respondent distinguishes Cate from the present case on the
ground that the Appellant visited the state four times in two years,
that Milt Gordon who oversaw certain of Appellantfs interests was
present in the state and that Appellant made telephone calls to
parties in Utah approximately once a week for about two years.
•4-

In comparing the two cases, it is submitted that the distinctions
do not hold up.

In the nrespnt matter, Appellant made telephone

calls to Utah approximately once a week for about two years, and
*-n Cate« defendant made five telephone calls a year over ten years*
Apparently, Respondent would have this Court hold that one hundred
telephone calls are sufficient to subject one to the Court's jurisdiction but fifty telephone calls are not.
ful distinction.

This is not a meaning-

More relevant than this is the fact that in Cate.

the contacts followed a regular ten year course, yet in the instant
case the same kinds of contacts lasted over a period of only two
years.

In both cases, defendants entered the State of Utah.

Cate, the purpose was to discuss business dealings.

In

Here, it was

also to discuss business dealings, but not to discuss the guaranty
in question.

This guaranty was first mentioned by one of Respon-

dent's employees by telephone to Appellant in Las Vegas, Nevada,
and it was later sent to Las Vegas where it was signed.
never discussed between them in Utah.

It was

(Respondents Brief, p. 30;

R. 99, 110)
It should also be pointed out that in CateT a corporation had
been conducting F.O.B. business involving heavy equipment in Salt
Lakes City for ten years.

Here, we have a private citizen who exe-

cuted a guaranty in Nevada.

Admittedly, Mr. Morris did have some

business interests in Utah.

He had an "agent11 in Utah to assist

5

him in overseeing those interests.

Respondent astutely points out

that no claim of lack of jurisdiction could be asserted if Respondent were suing Hawkeye Investment, a Nevada corporation, in the
State of Utah, inasmuch as Hawkeye was conducting business in Utah
and meets all of the jurisdictional requirements set forth in Hill
v. Zale Corporation, 25 U.2d 357, 482 P.2d 332 (1971), (Respondent1
Brief, p. 6)

What Respondent neglects to articulate is that it is

not suing Hawkeye Investment, it is suing Mr. Morris, an individual
on the guaranty signed by him in NeVada.

Mr. Morris1 business for

the purposes of the Utah long-arm statute was, if anything, the
signing of guaranties, not the baking of cookies.
conducted by Mr. Morris in Nevada.
sign guaranties for him in Utah.

This business wa

He had no agent empowered to

Mr. Morris1 contacts with the

State of Utah fail to satisfy any of the seven criteria set forth
in Zale. supra.

He had no local address or telephone, no employees

no advertising, no bank account, etc.

His activities were not what

the courts have termed "continuous and systematic11; the guaranty wa
executed in Nevada, and Respondent could easily establish jurisdict
over Morris in Nevada.

The jurisdictional requirements are there-

fore lacking.
Cate is controlling, the contacts with Utah in Cate, while not
quite as numerous as those in the present case, were as substantial
and demonstrated a much stronger continuity than those found here.

-6-

On the basis of Gate, the opinion of the lower court should be
reversed on the ground that that court lacked the proper basis for
asserting jurisdiction over Appellant.
The second Utah Supreme Court case bearing on the jurisdictional issue is Union Ski Co.% supra, decided by this Court on
March 31, 1976.

It involved an attempt by a Utah corporation

("Ski") to dssert long-arm jurisdiction over a California corporation ("Plastics") in a suit for breach of contract.

The Utah con-

tacts as enumerated in Plastics' brief, pages 7, 8 and 9, were as
follows:
Date of Event
Spring 1973

From the spring of 1973 until Dec. 1973
"Brent C. Hall was General Sales Manager
for Miller Ski of Orem, Utah

Summer 1973

Plastics CONTACTED Brent C. Hall in the
summer of 1973 and commenced negotiations
with Miller Ski for the manufacture of a
plastic ski boot Plastics designed

August 1973

Hall instructed Miller Ski Distributor
to ship boots currently used by Miller
Ski to Plastics

November 1973

In November Earl Miller owner of Miller
ski rejects project and Miller-Plastics
negotiations cease

Dec 1, 1973

Brent C. Hall becomes part-time employee
for Miller Ski and forms new company
Sports Industries, Inc in Utah

December 1973

Plastics commences negotiations with
Sports by telephone

-7-

Dec 28, 1973

Plastics general manager comes to Utah
with a proposed written contract for
Sports to distribute Plasticfs boot.
No agreement is reached

Jan 4, 5 1974

Plastics general manager comes to Utah
on January 4 & 5 to negotiation (sic)
contract. Plastics denies contract was
"executed" January 5 but admits performance commenced

Jan 11 1974

Plastics while in Utah hire Utah artesian
(sic) to work on boot. Messiers (sic)
Wight Jr. & Sr. of SLC are hired

Hab 6-11, 1974

Sports Industries forms Union Ski Company
Partnership; hires sales force; prints
sales literature; plans national sales
"kick-off" meeting

Jan 11, 1974

Plastics general manager speaks at "kickoff" meeting for about two hours (tape recorded by Sports for future meetings) abou
boot and how to sell it to customers. Literature about Plastics corp. organization
distributed

Jan 15, 1974

Plastics negotiates $25,000.00 check from
Sports Industries which states on check:
"initial payment on agreement dated Jan. 5
1974"

Jan. or Spring
1974

Plastics general manager meets with Utah
bank to establish joint account with Ski
as part of financing plan. Account was
not opened at that time as it was not yet
needed

Feb 13, 1974

Union Ski is Incorporated & assumes contract rights

Jan 18 &
Spring 1974

Ski commences trips to Calif, to review
progress of production; various trips were
made on different dates

-8-

Mar 26, 1974

Plasticfs employee, Allan Kinder, comes to
Utah to discuss design and products problems

Early Spring
1974 Various
dates

Plastics general manager attends several
ski industry trade shows to help staff Union
Ski's sales booth & distribute literature
about his company & their manufacturing of
boot

April 5, 1974

Artesian (sic), Franks Riggs, is hired by
Plastics to do work on the project in March
and in April Plastics general manager comes
to Utah td review his work on the project

April 30, 1974

General Manager of Plastics writes report
to his superiors and acknowledges receipt
of $218,000.00 worth of orders from ski

Unknown

the January 5, 1974 agreement is amended
sometime in the spring of 1974 and several
Signatures were placed on the agreement on
$ome unknown day

In Union Ski« this Court sustained the lower court in its
finding that the proper basis for long-arm jurisdiction was lacking,
holding that notwithstanding the above facts, it had not been demonstrated that defendant engaged in activities in Utah sufficient to
render it subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Reviewing the facts in the present case, we find them strikingly
similar but with a few significant differences.
the facts that:

Similarities include

Morris was in Utah four times, at which times he

visited Hawkeye Investment's plant; business negotiations were conducted by mail and telephone; a contract was signed out of state;
and the enforcement of the contract was subsequently attempted In
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Utah courts. A difference between this case and Union Ski is
found in the fact that while Morris was in Utah, he at no time
visited Respondent^ plant, nor were any negotiations conducted
in Utah between Morris and PCA regarding the guaranty which is
the subject matter of this lawsuit.

These negotiations took

place while Morris was in Nevada, his state of residence.

While

Hawkeye had numerous contacts with PCA in Utah in the course of
its business of making cookies, Mr. Morris had none.
contact was with regard to the guaranties.

His sole

His "business11, so to

speak, with PCA was the making of guaranties, and the guaranty
over which this controversy arose was negotiated and executed In
Nevada.

Sufficient contacts upon which to base long-arm juris-

diction over Mr. Morris in a suit by Respondent are therefore
lacking.

Another difference will be found in the fact that Union

Ski involved a foreign corporation's contacts with the State of
Utah while in this case we are dealing with an individual nonresident looking out for his own interests.

He had business intere

within the State of Utah which he personally looked after during
his periodic visits to the state and through Milt Gordon, who
assisted him in overseeing these interests, but these interests
are not the subject matter of this lawsuit.

The subject matter

of this lawsuit is the guaranty signed by Mr. Morris in Las Vegas.
As to this guaranty, he had neither the requisite contacts with

-10-

the state nor an agent empowered to negotiate it or execute it
in the state.

Union Ski can indeed be distinguished from the

present case, but any meaningful distinction cuts against the
finding of long-arm jurisdiction, not in favor of it.
The Utah Supreme Court in Union Ski cites the United States
Supreme Courtfs warning against too extended an application of the
recent decisions by that Court on long-arm jurisdiction.
at 1258.

548 P.2d

Such a case is presented here where the activities en-

gaged in by Appellant relative to the guaranty which is the subject matter of this suit are not sufficient activity and do not
reflect the degree of continuity required by Union Ski. Union Ski
is controlling in this case, it represents the law regarding longarm jurisdiction in Utah.

Under Union Ski, jurisdiction should

be found lacking in the present case inasmuch as Respondent failed
to show that Appellant's contacts with the State of Utah were sufficient to confer the right to assert jurisdiction over him in the
courts of this state and that jurisdiction cannot better be found
elsewhere.
Mecham is the third and most recent Utah Supreme Court case
dealing with long-arm jurisdiction.

Mecham was a suit in Utah on

a judgment granted against Mecham, a Utah resident, by an Idaho
District court on a guaranty executed by Mecham in Utah.
Mecham was an officer of the Great Basin Grain Company located
at Tetonia, Idaho, from the time of its formation until he
-11-

disassociated himself from the company.

Mecham, as an officer

of said corporation, made one trip to Idaho where he discussed
the internal affairs of the company.

Two guaranty agreements

were executed by Mecham with defendants in Utah, which guaranties were subject matter of the lawsuit.

The court found that

Mecham had never asserted a business presence in Idaho and had
no business address in that state, nor did he ever have a telephone listing in Idaho.

In denying the jurisdiction of the Idaho

courts over Mecham, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court
in ruling that the Idaho courts had failed to obtain jurisdiction
over Mecham through the Idaho Long-Arm Statute, a statute quite
similar to the Utah statute.
This Court in Mecham set forth five guidelines for determining
whether a state has jurisdiction over a given defendant, which are:
(1) the nature and quality of contacts in the forum state; (2) the
quantity of such contacts; (3) relationship of the cause to the
contacts; (4) interest of the forum state in providing a forum
for its residents; and (5) convenience of the parties.

These

guidelines are more or less along the lines of those set forth in
Zale, supra.

Guideline number (3) in Mecham, however, amplifies

and clarifies the Zale criteria by focusing on the relationship
of the cause of action to the contacts.
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The foregoing focus is ignored by the Respondent in the
instant case.
of Utah.

Mr. Morris did have some contacts with the State

Mecham had some contacts with the State of Idaho.

Cate, the Montana corporation had some contacts with Utah.

In
In

Union Ski, Plastics, a California corporation, had some contacts
with Utah.
be lacking.

In each of these cases> jurisdiction was found to
In these cases, this Court talked in terms of the

nature of the visits, local offices, or outlets, addresses, telephone listings, etc., as examples of substantial activity and
continuity.

Much of this was aimed at establishing a relation-

ship between the cause of action and the non-resident's contacts
with the State.

This relationship was found lacking in Cate% in

Union Ski, and in Mecham.

It is also lacking in the instant case.

There is no meaningful nexus between the activities of Hawkeye
Investment, a corporation, in Utah and the signing of a guaranty
by Mr. Morris, a Nevada resident, in Nevada.

Mr. Morris did have

limited contacts with Utah in his capacity of stockholder in a
Nevada corporation doing business in Utah, but these are certainly
less meaningful than those of Mecham with Idaho in his capacity
of a corporate officer of an Idaho corporation.

Both executed

guaranties in the states of their residences, and in both cases
in personam long-arm jurisdiction is lacking.

-13-

The only ground upon which Appellant can conceive that jurisdiction might be established is that of "alter ego11, but as that
was not plead and established below and was not raised on appeal
here, it fails.
CONCLUSION
Respondent suggests that Appellant has engaged in generalities
and has not shown specifically wherein the lower court erred.

Rath

Appellant showed specifically in its brief the points wherein the
lower court erred and now, by this reply brief, demonstrates the
veracity of its position in light of recent, important Utah Supreme
Court decisions.

It should be noted in connection with said de-

cisions that they were decided subsequent to the trial of the matter and that the trial court did not have the benefit thereof.
The lower court erred in attempting to assert jurisdiction over
Mr. Morris.

Therefore, Appellant Morris respectfully requests

that the judgment of the lower court be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

Paul T. Moxley
JOHNSON & SPACKMAN
Attorneys for Appellant
William W. Morris
1320 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-322-5614

-14-

Certificate of Service
The foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant William W. Morris
was served upon Respondent Packaging Corporation of America
by mailing, first class and postage prepaid, two copies thereof
to its attorney, Lauren N. Beasley, of COTRO-MANES, WARR,
FANKHAUSER & BEASLEY, at his offices at 430 Judge Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this
1976.
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GATE RENTAL COMPANY, INC. Y. WHALEN & COMPANY
without sufficient merit to justify extending this decision, or to reverse the judgment.
Affirmed No costs awarded.
ELLETT and MAUGMAN, JJ.f concur.
TUCKETT, J , dissent*.
HENRIOD, C J.f does not participate
herein.
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CATE RENTAL COMPANY, INC*
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
W H A L E N &. COMPANY, Deftndtnt
and Respondent.

Utah

707

P M 707
1. Courts O I 2 ( 2 )

Long 'inn statutory requirement of
"transaction of business within the state"
is that defendant has engaged in some substantial aetmty with some degree of contiruiit> within Utah. U C A.1953, 78-27-*
2. Corporations 0>665(1)
Where foreign corporation in con: ection with leasing and purchasing hea\y
construction and mining equipment had
called Utah corporation on average of five
times a >ear for past ten years to discuss
rental or purchase of equipment, Utah corporation would then *hip equipment f o b .
and bill foreign corporation which paid b>
mail, foreign corporation's president had
been in Utah to discuss business dealings
on one occasion in 1973, and particular
transaction had been entered into b\ telephone call in custom iry m inner, foreign
corporation had engaged in insufticienr activities to subject it to jurisdiction under
Utah long-arm statute
U.C A 1953, 7S27-5

No. 14292.
Supreme Court of Utah
May 5, 1070

R CpflnT" Mangrum/of Christenscn, Gardiner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake Cit\, for
plaintiff and appellant.

The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Marccllus K Snow, J., quashed attempted service on foreign corporation,
and plaintiff Utah corporation appealed.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J , held that
where lora&n corporation in connection
with leasing and purchasing hca\y conftruction and mining equipment had called
Utah corporation on a\crage of fi\e tunes
p year for past ten years, Utah corporation
(shipped equipment f. o. b and billed foreign corporation which paid by mail, and
particular transaction was entered into by
telephone call m customary manner, foreign
corporation engaged in insufficient activities within Utah to subject it to jurisdiction
under Utah long-arm statute.
Affirmed,
Maughan, J , filed dissenting opinion.
I

Dean I Conder, Stephen L. llcnnod, of
Nielsen, Conder, llennod & Gottfredson,
Salt 1 ake City, for defendant and respondent.
CROCK CTT, Justice*
Plaintiff, Catc Rental Co, appeals from
the granting of a motion to quash attempted service of summons upon defendant
Whalcn &. Co, of Montana, under the
long-arm statute.1
1 roin its Salt I ake I ity business, plaintiff, a Utah corporation, sells and rents
heavy construction and mining equipment
to customers in this state and thiemghout
the intcrinountain area. Since 1**62 elcfendant has been one of its customers m
leasing and purchasing some of its equipment. This particular suit arose out of an

Se«tioii 78-27-5, U.C.A IftM.
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agreement by a telephone call from the defendant in Montana to lease a front-end
loader which was shipped to defendant's
Montana job site in accordance with the
defendant's instructions. Thereafter a dispute (detail not material here) arose between the parties and the plaintiff initiated
this suit.
The activities relied on by plaintiff to
give the Utah court jurisdiction arc set
forth in its brief\ Yhat defendant called
plaintiff by telephone and discussed the
rental or purchase of equipment on the
average of five times a year for the past
ten years. Plaintiff would ship the equipment f. o. b. its offices in Salt Lake City,
and bill defendant, who would pay by mail.
This particular transaction was entered
into by a telephone call in the customary
manner; and further, the defendant's president, jerry Whalcn, was i n S a l t Lake City
to discuss their business dealings on one
occasion in 1(>73.
""
The trial court agreed with the defendant's challenge to the Utah court's jurisdiction on the ground that the foregoing fact*
did not show sufficient activities or business presence within the state of Utah to
subject it to the jurisdiction of our courts.
[1] It is our opinion that fairness and
good conscience demand that we accord to
citizens of other states who desire to make
purchases here, or who may visit here or
engage in any kind of transitory transactions, the same protections from possible
harassment by long distance lawsuits as we
expect to be accorded our citizens in similar circumstances in our sister states. Accordingly, the requirement of the statute of
the "transaction of business within this
state" is that the defendant has engaged in
some substantial activity with some degree
of continuity within our state.
[2] This case is very similar in pertinent aspects to the recently decided Union
Ski Co. v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P.2d
1257 (Utah, 1976), in which wc affirmed
the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of a suit for breach of contract by

a Utah corporation against a California
corporation. A comparison shows that the
defendant here had even less activities
within this state upon which service under
the long-arm statute could properly be
based. The principles set forth in the t/wion Ski case are controlling here.
Affirmed. Inasmuch as defendant has
not submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
our court to ask for affirmative relief, no
costs are awarded.
H K N R l O t ) , C. J., and E L L E T T
T U C K E T T , JJ., concur.

and

M A U G H A N , Justice (dissenting):
The reasons for dissent are adequately
stated in my dissenting opinion in Union
Ski Company v. Union Plastics Corporation, 54S I\2d 1257, (Utah, 1976), to which
reference is made.
Appropriate also is the following statement from 27 A.L.RJd, Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident, Section J, page 418:
However, it can be stated
safely that in most jurisdictions the trend
is toward expanding jurisdiction over
nonresidents. It has been said that this
trend toward liberality is creative of a
"minimum contact" rule as prerequisite
to the exercise of power over nonresident defendants.
Under statutes predicating jurisdiction
on the transaction of "any" business or
merely on "transacting business," it has
been held that the volume of business
done by the nonresident in the forum
state is not the only method by which
the necessary contacts can be established.
Moreover, the courts have recognized a
distinction between activities of a foreign corporation which will bring the
, corporation within the jurisdiction of the
local courts, and activities necessary to
subject the foreign corporation to domestication.
This latter distinction, I believe, we hav<
not made; and, in not doing so, have saddled residents with burdens not anticipated
by our statute.

UNION SKI COMPANY v. UNION PLASTICS CORPORATION

Utah 1 2 5 7

Cite a* r>!8 V .M U

defend tut had trms.ietttl business within
tin state
U ( \ V*\t 7* 27 24, 7X-27-2S

UNION SKI COMPANY, Plaintiff

and Appellant,
v.

4. Appeal and Error 0>911(3)
On appeal, Supreme ( ourt indulged
the presumption of verity and eorrectness
of trial eouifs determination that foreign
Corpoiation had not transacted business in
state so as to be subject to jurisdiction of
Utah courts upon service under long-arm
statute atid determiu ition would not be disturbed unless plaintiff showed that it was
an error

UNION PLASTICS CORPORATION,

Defendant and Respondent.
No. 14065.
MintH wo Court of I tah
March 31, 1070

Utah
corporation
brought
action
against California corporation to recover
for damage allegedly suffered b( cause of
defendant's breath of contract rditing to
plan for defendant to manufacture ski
iKKJts The I ourth District Court, Utah
Count), VU n B Sorenseu, J , granted mo
Hon of defendint, which had been strved
under the long arm statute, to dismiss for
Uck of jurisdiction over it diu\ plaintiff
appealed
The Supreme Court, C rockctt,
J, held that plaintiff failed to show that
defendant had engaged in activities in
Utah sufficient to subject it to jurisdiction
of Utah courts.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion.
1. Courts C=>I2(2)
It is prerogative of state to set its own
standards *cs to what contacts or activities
vuthm state are sufticieut to meet requirements of long arm statute, so long as tlu>
do not tall ht low r* quircuie fits under adjudications based upon provisions of Constitution of United States
U.C.A 1953, 7827-24, 7&-27~2^
2. Courts C=M2<2)
Transaction of business within lougArm statute requires that defendant engage in some substantial activity with
*cne degree of continuity within state
I C A PM, 78-27-24, 7H-27-25.
3. Corporations C=>673
Burden was upon plaintiff suing foreign corporation served under long arm
statute to affirmatively demonstrate that
548 F 2<J—79Ct

5. Courts C=>I2(2)
(•encrallv it is moie fan and logical to
find jurisdiction m forum state when major aspects of activitv out of which cause
of action aris< s incur in th.it state and
converselv, determiu ttion of jurisdiction in
forum state is less likely to be found where
principal activities take place elsewhere.
U ( \ I'M, 7$ 27~3\t 78 27-25.

v

6. Corporations C=^673
In suit against foteign corporation to
recover for damage allegedly resulting
from defendant's breach ot contract relating to plan for defendant to manufacture
ski boots, plaintiff failed to show that defendant, served under long arm statute,
had engaged in activities m Utah sufficient
to subject it to jurisdiction of Utah courts.
U.C.A P M , 7X-27 24, 7S-27-2*

J Hunt Wood, Piuvu. Dave McMulhn,
Pa\son forplauttitt and appellant
Douglas | Pcir), Salt Lake I it), for defendant and respondent
C ROl KI H \ Justice
Plaintiff, Union ski Company, a Utah
coipoiation, brought this action against defendant, L nion Plasties I orporation. a California corporation, to recover for damages
alleged'y sutfered because ot defendant's
breach of contract relating to a plan for
defendant to manufacture ski boots
Defendant was served as provided m section
7H-27~2^, VL \ P M , the so called LongArm Statute
I rom the granting of de-
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fendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over it, the plaintiff appeals.
In the fall of 1073, Hrent U Hall, a
Utah resident, \isited the Union Plastics
(Plastics) plant in California to discuss the
feasibility of having Plastics manufacture
a ski hoot for Miller Ski Companv, which
then employed Mr. Hall
In November,
V>7*1, Miller abandoned the project. However, Plastics had indicated some interest
in the plan, so Mr Hall and \iben K. Job
ley, also a Utah resident, form* d a new
Utah corporation, Sports Industries, Inc ,
to market the boots vvhuh Plastics would
manufacture. The name was later changed
to Union Ski Compan>
Negotiations between the two firms began in November, P>73, and, on December
2H, l n 73, Arthur Fi/enberg, general man
ager of Plastics, Came to Utah 'I he trip
was pnmaril) a ski vacation for Mr I izenberg and his fanul), but he did bring a
proposed contract, which proved nnaeeeptable to Ski. Mr. I izcnbe rg returned to
Utah on January 5, V>7\, whin he nut
with Ski An oral understanding was arrived at, which was to be computed in
typewritten form, and then executed b> the
parties, which was not the n accomplished
After some changes, the contract in controversy hire was signed in April, 1974, b)
Plastics in California.

{2) Contracting to supply services or
goods in this state ; . . .
[ 1 | It is the prerogative of this State
to set its own standards as to what contaets or activities within the State are sufficient to meet the requirements of that
statute, so long as the) do not fall below
the reepiirenu nts under adjudications based
upon provisions of the ( onstitution e)f the
United States, eited and reheel upon \*y
plaiutttl 1
Ne>twithstanding the averted
tieiul toward liberality in allowing the acquisition (if jurisdiction, with which this
court is generally in agreement, it is significant to note that in Hanson v
J)i'9uklii* decided subsequent to those cases, the Unite el States Supreme Lourt warned against too exteneleel AU application of
those ekeisions:
Hut it is a mistake to assume that this
trend he iaids the eventual demise of all
resti it tions on the* personal jurisdiction
ot state courts
(citation] Those rest! utions t\r< more than a guarantee of
immunity from inconvenient or distant
litigation. '1 he > are a conseepienee of
territorial limitations on the power of
the respective states. However minimal
the burden e>! defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant ma\ ne*t be called
upon to do so unless he has had the
"minimal contacts*' with th.it State that
tire- a pti requisite to its exercise of power e>vei him | e nations j

I*or Utah to at quire jurisdiction over tin
defendant, it would have to be on the basi
of our statute, Section 7X-27-24, U.l . V
1953, which prov ides •

I.

*

*

*

*

*

*

Am person . . . who in person or
through an agent does am of the following enumerated acts, submits himself,
. to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state as to any claim arising
from

[l]t is essential is eaeh ease
that t i m e be some act hy which the e!efend.uu pmposefuM) aN.ulx rtseH oi the
privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state, thus invoking the benefits anel protections of its laws
(citation) 3

(1) The transaction of any business
within this state;

It is undoubted!) true that effect should
be given to the policy declaration in our

MfOre
3.v» r.x.
(]U7*7);
ton, 32H
(11M5).

r International f.ife Jnsur am e Co,
2
irno, TS s.ct. u»<», 2 L I M I M TSI
Internatutnal Shoe Co. ? Washing
U.S. ;{I0, ik> X.Ct. 151, [H> M M . *X> 3.

:j.vr r x . 'j:ir>% ?x s.ct.

irjs. 2 L . n u d

id nt pp. 1*51, i»r»:{, 78 x r t . »t pp. IL\*S.
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in t h e

forum

statute, 4 t h a t the j u r i s d i c t i o n of o u r c o u r t s

logical

.should be e x t e n d e d to p r o t e c t t h e c i t i z e n s

state w h e n the m a j o r a s p e c t s of t h e a c t i v i -

of this S t a t e c o n s i s t e n t

with c o n c e p t s of

to

find

jurisdiction

ty out of which the c a u s e of a c t i o n a r i s e s

fairness a n d equal j u s t i c e u n d e r d u e p r o c -

o c c u r s in that s t a t e ;

c<s of law.

clctcnnin.itton of j u r i s d i c t i o n in t h e

Hut the o t h e r side of this c o m

ts that t h e rule of law should also p r o t e c t
our citizens from suits in o t h e r s t a t e s , unlc*s they h a v e e n g a g e d in some c o n d u c t or
activity t h e r e beyond a m e r e casual or
transitory p r e s e n c e t h e r e i n ; and c o n c o m i tantly, that t h e r e s i d e n t s of o u r sister
states should be given t h e s a m e p r o t e c t i o n s
.
.
•
,
here as w e e x p e c t o u r c i t i z e n s to be a o
. . .
conkd t h e r e .
[2] In h a r m o n y w i t h t h e f o r e g o i n g this
court h a s consistently held t h a t t h e t r a n s idion of business w i t h i n the m e a n i n g of
our statute r e q u i r e s that t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s
tti^aged in some s u b s t a n t i a l activity with
yjnie d e g r e e of c o n t i n u i t y w i t h i n t h i s
>tate 5 In the case of / / / / / r . Zalc Corp*
«v set forth a n u m b e r of e x a m p l e s of acivity to be e x a m i n e d
in d e t e r m i n i n g
whether, by r e a s o n of any one of t h e m , o r
..ny combination of t h e m , it can fairly a n d
reasonably be said t h a t a c t i v i t i e s of t h e
foreign c o r p o r a t i o n in t h i s S t a t e should
subject it to t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of o u r c o u r t s .
T%
,
*i
i ,
f , C1
u #v
[3-5]
In a n a l y z i n g w h e t h e r the plain•- •
v
/i » .i
i :
«
;it! has s h o w n t h a t the d e f e n d a n t c o m e s
,
...
. ,,
„•
within that r e q u i r e m e n t , these p r o p o s i t i o n s
,rc to be c o n s i d e r e d ; F i r s t , t h e b u r d e n
.as upon the plaintiff to a f f i r m a t i v e l y so
demonstrate.
Second, on appeal we iniul^t the p r e s u m p t i o n of verity a n d correctr.i-ss of the trial c o u r t ' s ' d e t e r m i n a t i o n
,nd do not d i s t u r b it u n l e s s t h e plaintiff
ha $ shown t h a t it w a s in e r r o r .
Third,
•
•here is a f u r t h e r principle, r e c o g n i z e d in
-.i$ area of t h c law, w h i c h may be r e g a r d
J as h a v i n g

some

bearing

hurt's d e t e r m i n a t i o n h e r e .

cm t h e

trial

T h a t is, t h a t it

» generally t h o u g h t to be m o r e fair a n d
i S v See. 7 S - - 7 - • * - ' . r.<\A.P>r,.'{.
i Ma< * rinanruil
< orf>, r. \rraaa
Motor
Hatful* Inc., TCU [\'J,\ \2U ( T r a i l ) ; Hanks
r Administrator
#»/ Estate of Jensen, ,%,'U I*.
j«! :*•»*•.t ( t ' t n h VMTt) ; Transnestrm
(Jeuerat
\gvti' y i*. Morgan,
5-t» I'.iM I IS<> ( I ' t u l i

and conversely, that
forum

s t a t e is less likely to he found w h e r e t h e
p r i n c i p a l a c t i v i t i e s ( t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e
c o n t r a c t , m a n u f a c t u r e of t h e hoots, a n d t h e
p a y m e n t s t h e r e f o r a n d d e f e n d a n t ' s alleged
breach
of
the
contract)
take
place
elsewhere.7
[61 T h e m a i n a c t i v i t y of the d e f e n d a n t
'
-,
relied upon by t h e plaintiff is t h a t of M r .
..
'
,'.
hi/enberg.
H e visited t tali a total of
four t u n e s : t h e t w o o c c a s i o n s p r e v i o u s l y
m e n t i o n e d , a n d a g a i n on J a n u a r y 11, •1**74,
a n d April 5, 1 *>7 4. O n the l a t t e r visits,
Mr. K i / c n b c r g a t t e n d e d m e e t i n g s about t h e
p l a n n i n g of sales a f t e r the boots should be
m a n u f a c t u r e d , and he also inspected S k i ' s
o p e r a t i o n s . D e f e n d a n t Plasties did pay for
some work d o n e by t h r e e e m p l o y e e s selected and r e t a i n e d by Ski. Hut P l a s t i c s did
not h a v e any b u s i n e s s situs by way of of(ice or s t o r e or o t h e r w i s e in the S t a t e , n o r
a n y p r o p e r t y , i n v e n t o r y , t e l e p h o n e listing
or bank a c c o u n t ; n o r d o any a d v e r t i s i n g
here.
F u r t h e r , t h e c o n t r a c t on w h i c h
plaintiff relies w a s e x e c u t e d in d e f e n d a n t ' s
!
behalf in C a l i f o r n i a ; it p r o v i d e d that all
*
p a y m e n t s would be m a d e to P l a s t i c s ' b a n k
* Vi)M
; t l , c r c ' , h a t a ! 1 *!T , u ' M t s w o l l M W
'
l a i c s ' C a l i f o r n i a plant, w h e r e t h e shoes
u r r c
lo
1,c
'Manufactured; and that the
l a w s of C a l i f o r n i a would g o v e r n t h e a g r e e l

ment.
W | u . n ,,|c fort.K<)il,K f a c t s a r e c o n s i ( | c r e d
• . . . , ...
r ,.
. „ - • t t . t • . „ ,%•
m t h e light ot the p r i n c i p l e s a h o v e d i s n 1 s s c d a n ( l a s S1 . t f o r l h i n t h c c i u . a c a s t . S f
u c a r c n o t p c r s u . t d c d that we should disa-

^ r e e with the d e t e r m i n a t i o n
trial c o u r t :

m a d e by t h e

that it" w a s not s h o w n t h a t the

d e f e n d a n t had e n g a g e d in a c t i v i t i e s in t h i s
1I>7J):
g
7.

r*lU,],ini

V. Stirhn

d Si>n*, ?C2 P.1M

L»r» P t a h -M .T»7. 4VJ 1V-M .'UTJ.
Moor«\ Kedernl Praetiei-. S««e. 1.2.1 CM K d .
P.M/T), a n d a u t h o r i t i e s t h e r v i u eitctl.
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State sufficient to render it subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts.
Affirmed.

No costs awarded.

UKNRIOI), C J , and FLU-TIT and
Tl'CKKTT, j j . , concur.
MATCH AN, Justice (dissenting):
For the following reasons 1 dissent:
All statutory references are to U.C.A.
10$ J, as amended. Our statute, 78-27-22,
declares:
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public interest demands the state provide its citizens
with an effective means of redress
against
nonresident
persons,
who
through certain significant minimal contacts with this state, incur obligations to
citizens entitled to the state's protection.
This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress
which has substantially increased the
flow of commerce between the several
states resulting in increased interaction
between persons of this state and persons of other states.

The court today fails to follow this law
in several important particulars. It fails to
recognize the legislative determination. It
fails to recognize significant minimal contacts. If fails even to mention the obligations, viz., $25,1*1X1, inter alia, to a citizen
entitled to this State's protection. It fails
to recognize the -increased interaction be
tween persons of this State and persons of
other states. Not only does it not insure
maximum protection to citizens of this
State, it insures only minimal protection.
It would appear that the statute has been
reversed to require, maximum contacts % ith
this State, in Order to insure minimal protection to its citizens, Patently, the statute
is not applied to the "fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"—the construction given it not only is not liberal, but extreme!)
restrictive.

It is, indeed, questionable to say (as the
court does today), it is the prerogative of
this State to set its own standards, for in
personam jurisdiction over nonresidents,
when the legislature has already set the
standards, and such jurisdiction is com
The provisions of this act, to ensure pletely dependent upon, and limited on!\
maximum protection to citizens of this by, the Federal constitution, viz., the lour
state, should be applied so as to assert
teenth Amendment. In this connection, i*
jurisdiction over nonrcsidetit defendants should not go unnoticed that the Contineii
to the fullest extent permitted by the due tal Congress, moved by oppressive st.it.
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend- , measures, inimical to a union of the stau»
ment to the lTnited States Constitution. convened the Constitutional Convcuttt*:
The statute is a remedial one, and our
A result of which brings to our legisLtu:
law requires it be liberally construed; to the power to set standards for in person.*?effect its object, and to promote justice. 1
jurisdiction over nonresidents; to ti,
Aside from the statute cited in the foot"fullest extent of the Fourteenth Ann:.'
note, its status as a remedial statute remerit." To hold otherwise, I believe ri;:
quires liberal construction. As was said in
Counter to the due process clause oi e .
Castle r. Delta L & H\ Co.* "Being remeown Constitution by denying ih\c proces* * :
dial, the statute must be liberally conlaw to one of our citizens; which t* «.
strued."
only not denied by our Constitution, bu:
I. i»H '.l 2. "Tli** rub* of fit** common law flint
MitttircM in derogation thereof tin* to IM* strictly eoiiMfrtM't) has no application to the NtHtllte*

of

thtM

*tlit«\

TllC

NlMlUtCN

4'Ntllhli.sll

tilt* Ii*W* Of tlllH HlUtl* rt*N|M»«*till)f tilt* MIlUjlM'tN

to which they refute, ami their provisions
Mild Aill proceedings umlcr them lire to In' hherulty construed with a view to effect the ob-

j e c l s of the s t a t u t e s iithl to promote 111%'

Whenever there is tiny variance l>t rv\••« t* *
rules of equity ami the rules of common :..
in reiVrenee to the same mutter the ruh»
equity Mhutl prevail."
2. 58 Ftah Ki7, 111), 197 I*. 584, 5.S5 <p,«.
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guaranteed hy the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The question hire is primarily a federal
one, ami secondarily a state one, although
the legislature has certainly given it prune
importance
In addition, \\c do not have
the problem of a statute attempting to restrict the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather one which endorses its operation to
the full. Taking jurisdiction of the facts
in this matter would fall far short of the
permissible limits of the
fourteenth
Amendment.
The mobility of the economy has
changed much since the International Shoe
use, of 104s, and the law relating to jurisdiction over nonresident defendants has
changed with it—L'tah excepted The concepts dealt with here are of such importance I wish to present my view of the
facts, and how the law is applicable to
them
The question on appeal is whether the
ictivities of a foreign corporation, m dialing with a Utah corporation, render the
foreign corporation amenable to the jurisdiction of the Utah court; under the
long-arm statute. Prior to the foreign corporation's answer, it interposed a motion to
<!IMNISS accompanied b> affidavits; the
plaintiff submitted counter-affidavits. The
•notion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
*as grantee! No findings were made. I
ftould reverse and remand for a trial on
ht merits.
The protagonists are plaintiff-appellant,
Union Ski Company, a Utah corporation,
•ereafter "Ski", and respondent-defendint, Union Plastics Corporation, a California corporation, hereafter "Plastics/*
Ski and Plastics entered into a contract,
Mtt which a ski boot was to be manufac,'cd by Plastics and supplied to Ski. The
jrtract contemplated long-range pay-cnts of which $25,<MX) was the initial pay-cnt—this initial payment was paid to
"astics by Ski. During the negotiations,
-a general manager for Plastics made sev•il trips to Utah in the i n t e n d of this

contract, engaged toe al boot designers, organized and conducted a sales meeting for
the promotion of the boot, personally negotiated with representatives of ski for
the mauufaetuie, promotion and sale of
that product Plasties also had its hand in
the advertising of the produet and demanded that its name be Used m any promotional efforts
The contract, dated January 5, P>74t contemplated a long serres of transactions,
with advance payments of $75,t)tH), beginning with 1074, pure bases of ski l>ootsi totaling $o(K),<X)0 were to be made; by 1078
a sales figure of $1,S00(IK>O was to be
reached A memorandum by Plastics' general manager stated that .Ski was to have
the exclusive sales and merchandising operation, in return for which the advance
payments of $75,<HX) would be maele. By
April of 1074, Ski had secured orders for
the boot amounting to $218,()<M). No boots
were supplied to Ski
It is undisputed that Plastics received
the $25,tiU> check, and negotiated it. It is
not disputed th.it the contract was executed, but it is dispute el where and when it
was executed. Ski claims that .ill significant indicia of minimal contacts in Utah,
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
Utah court, oceurnel in Utah, Plastics
(latins th.it such indicia oceurred in the
state* of California, aiiel that no significant
activities were earned on in the state of
Utah by Plastics to justify the Utah jurisdiction. The conflicts in the affidavits
themselves woulel be sufficient to rcepiire a
trial of the issues of fact.
Today, the court states that determination of jurisdiction in a foreign state is
less likely to be found where the principal
activities take place elsewhere, ami mentions the execution of the contract (the
record shows complete disagreement on the
place of execution), manufacture of the
boot, the paym its therefor, and defendant's alleged bleach of contraet. These
points together with the assertion that one
must maintain a business situs, execute the
contract, make the payment* in the forum
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state; and that all shipments should he
otherwise than F.O.H. outside the forum
state, were all disposed of M years ago in
International Shoe Company r. ll'ashhia/on. 3 There, in finding the state of Washington did have jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court said:
Appellant has no office in Washington
and makes no contracts either for sale or
purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that
state and makes there no deliveries of
goods in intrastate commerce. . . .
The authority of the salesmen is limited
to exhibiting their samples and soliciting
orders from prospective buyers, at prices
and on terms fixed by appellant. The
salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's office in Saint Louis for acceptance or rejection, and when accepted the
merchandise for filling the orders is
shipped f.o.b. from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state.
All the merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment from which collections are made.
No salesman has authority to enter into
contracts or to make collections.
The "long-arm statute" 4 gives us the
l>ertment definitions. "Any person*' is defined to mean any individual, firm, company, association, or corporation.
And
"transaction of any business within this
state" is defined to mean the activities of a
nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this State which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah.
Section 7&-Z7-24 provides:
Any person . . . whether or not a
citizen or resident of this state, who in
person or through an agent does any of
the following enumerated acts, submits
himself, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the

3. :cu r.s. 310, w s.ot. if**, oo L.Bd. W
U1H5).
4. 7&-21-'22 through 28, L.Luh IDoU

courts of this state as to any claim arising from:
(1) The transaction of any business
within this state;
(J) Contracting to supply services or
goods in this state;

*

*

*

*

*

*

In order to'properly understand the mandate of the legislature, \«/., that the longarm statute "should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent permitted by the
due process , clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the I'nited States Constitution," we must examine those decisions of
the I'mtcd Stall's Supreme Court, determining that clause in relation to the longarm statutes, and related statutes, of our
sister states. This is necessary because it
is not contemplated, in our federal system,
that each of fifty different jurisdictional
enclaves be a final arbiter of the meaning
of the federal constitution in litigation, between citizens of different states.
One of the principles established in the
famous case of /Ywm>\rr r. AV// f t was
that a court could not acquire jurisdiction
over a nonresident party, by serving process outside the forum, or by publication.
The first definite departure from that case
occurred in I nd-fn,itn>nal .Shoe Co. t\
Washington* where it was held there was
jurisdiction over a nonresident party, not
present within the territory of the forum;
if that party had certain minimum contacts
with the forum state, and if the maintenance of the suit did not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." It was further held there that
the terms "present" or "presence" merely
symbolize the activities of a corporate
agent, within the forum state, which will
be deemed to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process; that an estimate
5. Iffi U.S. 7H, 24 L.Kd. 5415 <lh77).

6. :rjo r.s. ;no, w set. IM, **> L.Ed. w
(1JH5).
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of the inconvenience incurred by defending
a suit away from one's home state is Relevant ; that single or occasional acts of a
corporate agent because of their nature
and quality and the circumstances of their
commission may be deemed sufficient $o
render the coiporation liable to suit; that
the satisfaction of the clue process require?
ment depends upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and
orderly administration of the laws which tt
was the purpose of the due process laws to
ensure; that a corporation availing itself
of the benefits and protections of the laws
of the forum state, while accepting the
privilege of engaging in activities therein,
puts itself in a position where it may be
made to respond to a suit to enfotce obligations arising out of such activities—this
can hardly be said to be contrary to com*
inon notions of justice and fair play.
International Sh&i* was the beginning of
a trend, and in McGec r. International
Life Insurante Co.,1 (which sustained the
personal jurisdiction of California), the
court, in commenting on this trend said:
Looking back over this long history of
litigation a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope
of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part
this is attributable to the fundamental
transfoimation of our national economy
over the years. Today many commercial
transactions touch two or more States
and may involve parties separated by
the full continent. With this increasing
nationalization of commerce has come a
great increase in the amount of business
conducted by mail across state lines. At
the same time modern transportation and
communication have made it much less
burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity.
*
*
*
*
*
*
It is sufficient for purposes of due
process that the suit was based on a con7. 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Kd.2d 223
(1957).

tract which had substantial connection
with that State.
That the trend begun in
International
Shoe does not countenance the removal of
all restrictions on the acquisition of personal jurisdiction b> state courts is pointed
out in Hanson r. Penekfa* where it was
said that such restrictions amount to more
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation, they are, in
fact, a consequence of territorial limitation
on the power of the respective states. It
was pointed out that minimal contacts are
necessary, and the sufficiency of the minimal contacts will vary with the quality and
nature of the defendant's activity. Further, that a defendant purposefully availing
itsilf of the privilege of engaging in activities within the forum state, invokes the
benefits ami protections of its laws.
Itoth J M M V and Pemkla
were single
occurrence cases. In A7<(/«v a Texas insurance company solicited a California resident, via mail, to purchase insurance; and
the California resident accepted the offer,
paid the premiums until his death, via mail.
In Denckla, it was held that the Florida
court did not acquire personal jurisdiction
over a Delaware trustee to determine the
validity of a trust established by a settlor,
who while domiciled in Pennsylvania, executed a trust in Delaware, and subsequently moved to Morula. Such was not an activity of the quality and nature to establish
minimal contact within Morida; nor was
there an act by which defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of engaging in activities within the forum state,
thus invoking the benefits and protections
of its laws. Denckla draws the outer limit
of state judicial power over a nonresident
defendant. The activities of Plastics, in
this matter} bear no relation to the limitation of Pemkla.
About the only similarity
is each involves litigation, between a plaintiff and defendant.
From the foregoing it can be seen that
the evolution of the law controlling state
8. 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 122S. 2 L.Kd^d
1263 (1958).
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judicial power, over nonresident defendants, has evolved to accommodate changing
conditions. This evolution shows acceptance and then abandonment of "consent,"
"doing business/* and "presence/* as conceptual determinants of state judicial power over foreign corporations.
As was said in Foreign Study League v.
Hollanii-America
Line9 cases of this na*
ture are strictly factual and are disposed
of by the application of case and statutory
law of the fact situation presented. A review of the undisputed facts is helpful.
A contract was executed, $25,<K)o was
paid by Ski to Plastics; Plastics* agent
Conducted activities within this State to
promote the sale of its product. These activities were in aid of the contract, which
contemplated a series of long-term commitments, and payment of further substantial
sums. The commitments to be performed
in Utah were a sine qua non of the contract. Pursuant to the contract, Ski secured orders, within the state of Utah and
elsewhere; in the amount of $2l8,(NK), for
the purchase of Plastics' product.
From the foregoing, we can see that
Plastics purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of acting within the state of
Utah; thereby causing a consequence, with
a substantial connection, in this State. It
is further evident that Svi's claim arose
from the activities of Plastics here. In addition, it is apparent that the acts of Plastics and the consequence caused by Plastics
had a substantial connection to this St.tte;
a connection, which created contacts within
this State, and makes the exercise of the
jurisdiction of this State over Plastics
reasonable. It cannot be doubted th.a this
State has an interest in such activities, and
in the protection of its citizens, from harm
suffered because of such activities. 10
t. 27 Utah 2d 442. 443, 407 P.2<1 244 (1072),
• 0. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industrie* Inc.. C.A.Oth liKW, 401 *\2*i 374.

A state case illuminating here is that of
Knight r. District Court of the 17th Judicial District, County of Adams, State of
Colorado.*1
There a Colorado bank
brought an action in Colorado, on a promissory note, against two citizens of Salt
Lake City, Utah, serving the petitioners in
Utah. The action was brought under a
1<nig-artti statute similar to our own. The
petitioners b.ul personally ap|K.\tred in Colorado to borrow the money. Thereafter a
renewal note was executed by petitioners
in Salt I^ike City, and sent by mail to the
bank in Colorado. The claim of petitioners was the Colorado bank did not have
jurisdiction over their persons.
Among
other things the court said :
. . . though the "last act/* such as
the signing of a contract, for example,
may have occurred outside the geographical confines of the forum state, nevertheless the statutory test of a claim arising out ot the transaction of any business within the state may still be met by
the showing of other "purposeful a c t s / '
performed within the forum state by the
defendant in relation to the contract,
even though such acts were preliminary,
or even subsequent, to the execution of
the contract itself. So, in the instant
case, though the petitioners admittedly
executed the renewal note in Utah, they
had each nonetheless performed in Colorado several "purposeful" acts relative
thereto. . . .
it seems to us to be eminently fair and just to require the petitioners, who were able to come over the
mountain to borrow $30,1)00, to return
when they are allegedly in default as
concerns repayment of the loan.
In the instant matter, the mountain is a
different one, but the principle is the same.
Traditional itotions of justice and fair play
require Plastics to return and respond to
the allegations of Ski,
II. 162 Colo. 14, 424 i\2d 110 (1967).
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ELLETT, Justice:
This lawsuit was initiated by Mr, Adams
for the return of a boat and personal property and damages for the alleged wrongful
taking and detention thereof. There is no
claim of right for the taking and detention,
if any, of personal property other than the
!»oat.
The issue involved herein is the validity
of a financing statement given to the appellant bank by the manufacturer of the
l>oat which described it as a "Seaflite
22()U Offshore # D.M.F.A. <K)82 M-75L."
The actual number of the boat is D.M.F.A.
0082 M-74L. The underscored numerals
indicate the year during which the boat
was manufactured. The serial number and
description of the engine in the boat is
correctly stated in the document.
The trial court gave a partial summary
judgment in favor of the respondent on
the ground that the "Financing Statement
. was defective and the defect was
sufficient to defeat the bank's security interest in the boat . . . ."
The trial court was in error in holding
that the figures showing the year of manufacture invalidate d the statement.
An
cxcelU ut article by Professor Boyce is
found in l°66 Utah Law Journal at page
52 wherein the law is set out and cases
cited. The article states:
The description of the goods required
to be contained in a security agreement
need not be so exact as to provide the
reader of the instrument with specific
knowledge of the property or collateral
imolved. The code provides that any
description of personal property or real
estate will be sufficient "whether or
not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described.
[70A-9-H0]
Thus, the requirement that personal
property in the form of goods be described by serial number, or similar identification, is repudiated (i%6 opinion,
Utah Attorney General, 31).

The general law is also set out in (f)
Amjur., Secured Transactions, Sec. 3^4:
Since the Uniform Commercial Code
merely requires only such description as
is sufficient to identify reasonably what
is described, whether or not it is specific,
it follows that the courts generally take
a liberal approach to descriptions set
forth in a financing statement, particularly where it is difficult to describe
the property accurately. Accordingly, it
follows that a court will overlook a failure to set forth a detailed description,
including the serial number of the collateral, in a financing statement.
The partial summary judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to try the
issues relating to the personal property
other than the boat. Costs are awarded
to the appellant.
HENKIOD, C J., and CROCKETT,
TUCKETT, and MAUGHAN, J).t concur.
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C H E V R O N C H E M I C A L COMPANY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Craig W. MECHAM and R. Kent Hello***,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 14423.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 24, 1970.

Appeal was taken from judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County* James S. Sawaya, J., which denied enforcement of Idaho judgments obtained
against individual. The Supreme Court,
Tuekett, J., held that individual who wa>
officer of corporation located in Idaho,
who gave guaranties to plaintiff to indemnify it against IOSM s which it might incur
on accounts with the corporation, who made

CHEVRON CHEMICAL COMPANY v. MECHAM
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only one trip to Idaho and had no contacts
with any customer or supplier or lending
institution during that trip, and who never
asserted a business presence in Idaho was
not subject to jurisdiction of Idaho court
under Idaho long-arm statute.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed an
opinion.

Courts C=»I2(2)

Individual who had signed guaranties
for the purpose of indemnifying company
against losses which it might incur on accounts with corporation, located in Idaho,
of wroth individual was an officer at the
time, who had always been a resident of
t'tah, who made one trip to Idaho but had
no contacts with any customer, supplier or
(ending institution on that trip, who never
asserted a business prestnce in Idaho and
had no business address there, and who
never consummated a business transaction
in Idaho as an individual was not subject
ko jurisdiction, of Idaho court under Idaho
long-arm statute with respect to the guaranties, which were not entered into in Idaho and which did not state that they were
to be performed in Idaho.

Leonard J. Lewis and E. Craig Smay,
of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Frank J. Allen, of Clyde & Pratt, Ronald
N. Boyce, Salt Lake City, for defendants
and respondents.
TUCKETT, Justice:
The plaintiff is here suing on a judgment entered against the
defendant
Mccham on February 13, 1975, in the Seventh Judicial District Court of the state of
Idaho. The action of the plaintiff in the
Idaho court was in two counts, the first being on a guaranty agreement dated July 31,
1968. The second count consisted of an
assigned cause of action by the Bank of
Salt Lake to the plaintiff of a guaranty

agreement dated Octu! r *>, 1968. The
District Court of Salt Lake County where
the present action was filed entered judgment in favur of the defendant Mccham
and the plaintiff appeals.
The two guaranty agieenieuts were given
to the plaintiff for the pur|>osc of indemnifying it against losses it might incur on
its accounts with Great Basin Grain Company, Inc., located at Tetonia, Idaho. The
case went to trial in the District Court of
Salt Lake County. That court made findings of fact which are not challenged on
appeal. Among other things the court
fouiK that the plaintiff corporation was a
Delaware corporation doing business in
California, Oregon, Idaho, and Utah; and
that .he defendant Mechani has always
been a resident of the state of Utah. The
court further found that Mecham was an
officer of the Gicat Basin Grain Company,
from ts formation until April, l°70, when
he disissociated himself from the corporation a id the plaintiff was so advised. The
action in Idaho was brought against the
defem ant Mecham as an individual. As an
officei of Great Basin, Mechani made one
trip to Idaho but he had no contacts with
any customer, or supplier, or lending institution but discussed with the defendant
Ileileson, president of Great Basin Grain,
only internal affairs of the company.
Mechani never asserted a business presence
in Idaho and he had no business address
in that state, i or did he have a telephone
lifting. As an individual Mecham never
Consummated a business transaction in Idaho. The court fuitber found that the instruments sued upon in the Idaho action
w«Te prepared »y the plaintiff in its Portland otfice and do not identify the state of
hi tho as the place for performance. Mecham terminated said guaranty by notifying the plaintiff at its Portland office.
Mecham made a special appearance in the
Idaho proceedings to challenge the jurisdiction of that court, but nevertheless judgment was entered against him. The court
further found that in respect to count two
of the complaint filed in Idaho, the guaran-
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ty executed by Mecham to the Hank of Salt
Lake was for the purpose of guaranteeing
an obligation of (ireat Basin to the bank.
The instrument was prepared in Salt Lake
City by the Bank of Salt Lake and executed
there. The Bank of Salt Lake assigned
its claim to the plaintiff for suit.
Jurisdiction of the Idaho court was asserted over Mecham by reason of Idaho's
long-arm statute.
That statute is quite
similar to the Utah long-arm statute as
well as the statutes of a number of other
states. In determining whether or not the
court of the forum state has jurisdiction,
certain standards and guidelines have been
enunciated by the courts of the various
jurisdictions. Those standards include the
following guidelines: (1) The nature and
quality of contacts in the forum state; (2)
quantity of such contacts; (3) relationship
of the cause to the contacts; (4) interest
of the forum slate in providing a forum
for its residents; (5) the convenience of
the parties. The plaintiff in support of its
claim that jurisdiction had been obtained
over Mecham by the Idaho court relies
heavily upon the case of Salter v. Lin^n}
a decision of the United States District
Court of Massachusetts wherein jurisdiction was upheld. In that case the defendant
had organized the corporation which later
became bankrupt, and for which he had
become a guarantor, as its agent or alter
ego. That court found that the defendant
hail organized, used, and controlled the
bankrupt corporation for the sole purpose
of carrying out his agreement with the
bishop under which he was to receive 10
per cent and the bishop (X) per cent of the
profits of certain nursing homes. The
facts in this case are entirely dissimilar.
The identical problem we have here was
before this court in the case of I an Kleeik
Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Company * w Inch was also a sun upon
the judgment entered by an Idaho court.
It is interesting to note that the "long-arm
statute" was the same as that in force in
Idaho at the time the action against
I.

21M F.Hupp. RS2.

Mecham was commenced in that state. The
individual defendants in that case had far
more contacts in the state of Idaho than
did Mecham in this case. This court upheld a decision of the trial court that the
Idaho court had failed to obtain jurisdiction over the individual defendants through
its long-arm statute and concluded that the
judgment entered in those proceedings
was not entitled to full faith and credit in
the state of Utah.
The record in this case supports the
trial c o s t ' s finding that the acts of Mecham in the slate of Idaho were performed
solely in his capacity as an officer of the
Idaho corporation. We find no error in
the record and the decision of the court below is affirmed.
H K N R I O D , C. J., and K L L E T T and
CROCK KTT, J J., concur.
M A U O I I A N , Justice (dissenting):
Reference is made to my dissents in
Vn'mn Ski Co. r. I'nion Plasties Corp.. 548
I\2d 1257 (Utah 1<>76), and Cate Rental
Company, Inc., v. Whalcn cr Company t 549
l \ 2 d 7 0 7 (Utah 1076).

The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Emll Martin SUNTER, Defendant

and Appellant.
No. 14363.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May JM. ID7U.
The Seventh Distriu Court, Carbon
County, Edward Sheya, J., found defendant
guilty of attempted burglary, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, ) . ,
2.
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